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STRENGTH IN NUMBERS: SETTING QUANTITATIVE CRITERIA FOR
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I. INTRODUCTION
For the animal shall not be measured by man. In a world older and more
complete than ours, they move, finished and complete, gifted with
extensions of the senses we have lost or never attained, living by voices we
shall never hear. They are not brethren, they are not underlings, they are
other nations caught with ours in the net of life and time, fellow prisoners
of the splendour and travail of the earth.1

Most Americans spend the majority of our time in artificial environments of our
own making. We live indoors, in a sealed-off land of bug spray, temperature control, and
an array of antibacterial products for our hands, dishes, and countertops. We keep pretty
plants alive by providing all of their daily care and allowing them to live in our insectfree environment, then we climb into bed and cuddle up to our furry four-legged
companions. We have developed a widely-shared, albeit completely unscientific,
hierarchy of life-forms. It seems innocent enough; even children know that there are cool
animals at the zoo, but worms are icky. Yet we do this at our own peril, because as
comfortable as we have become in our cozy indoor retreats, the real world still surrounds
us. We depend upon this natural world both for our aesthetic and spiritual enrichment
and for our very survival. In the real world, ecosystems depend upon a biodiversity that
does not rank species according to how lovable they are to humans.2
Fortunately, or so it would seem, Congress expressly recognized this disparity
between human valuation of species and nature's diverse needs, and stated its intent to

1

Beston, Henry, THE OUTERMOST HOUSE: A YEAR OF LIFE ON THE GREAT BEACH OF CAPE COD 25
(Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., 1928).
2
See E. O. Wilson, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE xxiii (2d ed. 1999) (“Recent experimental studies on
whole ecosystems support what was long suspected: in most cases, the more species living in an ecosystem,
the higher its productivity and the greater its ability to withstand drought and other kinds of environmental
stress. Since we depend on an abundance of functioning ecosystems to cleanse our water, enrich our soil,
and manufacture the very air we breathe, biodiversity is clearly not an inheritance to be discarded
carelessly.”). At a time of increasing global climate change, ecosystem resiliency is especially important.
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protect species equally.3 Just a few years later, Congress passed the Endangered Species
Act (ESA),4 intended “to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever
the cost.”5 And not a moment too soon, as species now go extinct at a rate of
approximately 100 per day, a rate which continues to rise.6 It is, of course, about time, as
“all species are doomed to extinction on a geological time scale. Our concern for
endangered species arises because current rates of extinction far exceed any the world has
experienced in the last 65 million years.”7
Congress gave us the tools to slow down this frenetically-paced loss of
biodiversity, but we have frittered away that opportunity by bickering over which species
we like best and our correspondingly variable willingness to make sacrifices to protect
them. The best way to free the process of protecting biodiversity from this quagmire is to
discipline ourselves and reduce the flexibility that engenders such frequent controversies.
Congress expressed its desire to protect species equally, and several decades later it is
getting more and more urgent that we establish a means of implementing that goal.
As will be discussed in greater detail below, the route a species must take to reach
the protections of the ESA begins with getting placed on a list of either endangered or
threatened species. Congress has described this listing process as “the keystone of the

3

The Senate Report connected with earlier endangered species legislation noted that “with each
species we eliminate, we reduce the pool of germ-plasm available for use by man in future years. Since
each living species and subspecies has developed in a unique way to adapt itself to the difficulty of living in
the world's environment, as a species is lost, its distinctive gene material, which may subsequently prove
invaluable to mankind in improving domestic animals or increasing resistance to disease or environmental
contaminants, is also irretrievably lost.” S. Rep. No. 91-526, at 3 (1969). The same report went on to cite
the above Henry Beston quote. Id.
4
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000).
5
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
6
Tim W. Clark, A Course on Species and Ecosystem Conservation: An Interdisciplinary Approach,
in YALE SCH. OF FORESTRY & ENVTL. STUDIES, BULLETIN SERIES NO. 105, SPECIES AND ECOSYSTEM
CONSERVATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 17, 33 (Tim W. Clark et al. eds., 2001).
7
Kent E. Holsinger, Population Biology for Policy Makers: Promises and Paradoxes, 45
BIOSCIENCE 10 (1995).
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Endangered Species Act.”8 The importance of getting listing done right becomes obvious
when considering the fact that ESA protection is an all or nothing game—either you get it
or you don't—and the only dividing line is listing.9 As a prerequisite for the application
of any other provision of the Act, listing is the single most important part of the Act.
Our system of listing species, like most others around the world, is based upon the
viability of each species. We engage in population viability analysis to determine how a
species is faring. That said, the scientific process of population viability analysis needs a
set of questions to answer. In other words, what levels of viability are we looking for?
Before scientists can determine whether a species fits into a listing category, we must
first determine what the criteria are for inclusion in that category. As it stands, we have
only loose definitions and factors upon which to base these analyses, resulting in an
extreme lack of consistency. As will be discussed further below, I propose the use of
quantitative criteria for each listing category. Quantitative criteria are numerical
thresholds applicable across the board (such as x percentage decline over x years or x
generations, x total population remaining, x amount of geographic range, etc.).
Part II of this article provides the background on the listing process that is needed
to consider the central arguments of the piece. Part III discusses the numerous problems
with the status quo, which combine to prevent us from meaningfully realizing the
expectations Congress had for the listing process. Part IV provides the support for my
primary thesis—that we can and should devise quantitative listing criteria—and suggests
an excellent model from which to work. Finally, Part V considers the various ways to
8

H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 10 (1982).
See Daniel J. Rohlf, There's Something Fishy Going On Here: A Critique of the National Marine
Fisheries Service's Definition of Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 617, 619 (1994)
(“Although characterized as the 'pit bull of federal environmental statutes,' the ESA is as meek as a kitten
unless an imperiled creature appears on the statute's lists of threatened and endangered species.”).
9

4

accomplish the goals presented here. The article then concludes with a plea to the new
administration to make this change.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ESA AND LISTING SPECIES
A. In the Beginning: The Evolution of U.S. Endangered Species Legislation and Listing
Priorities
The first U.S. endangered species legislation, the Endangered Species
Preservation Act of 1966,10 was the result of the Department of Interior's effort to obtain
funding for an endangered species program, after failed attempts to get that funding
absent a preservation statute.11 The 1966 Act required the Secretary of the Interior to list
species that were threatened with extinction,12 in consultation “with various scientific
groups having expertise in this field.”13 The Departments of Interior, Agriculture, and
Defense were all charged with protecting these species and their habitats.14
Next came the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969,15 which expanded
on protections for invertebrate species and restrictions on interstate commerce in listed
species.16 The 1969 Act included listing language still in use today, requiring the
decisions be based on “the best scientific and commercial data available.”17 The term
“commercial data” refers only to data that goes to a species' vulnerability—such as
threats from overutilization in commerce—and not to the consideration of economic

10

Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966). A discussion of the Act's provisions may be found in
Michael J. Bean, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 319-21 (revised and expanded ed. 1983).
11
See S. Rep. No. 89-1463, at 1, 2, 17 (1966).
12
Pub. L. No. 89-669, § 1(c).
13
S. Rep. No. 89-1463, at 3.
14
Pub. L. No. 89-669, § 1(b).
15
Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (1969). A discussion of the Act's provisions may be found in
Bean, supra note 10, at 374-79.
16
See Pub. L. No. 91-135, §§ 1(2), 2, 4(d), 12(a).
17
Id. § 3(a).
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factors, as Congress later clarified.18 While the legislative history does not elucidate the
meaning of “best scientific data available,” a “plausible explanation is that Congress
intended through this language to continue the 1966 Act's requirement that Interior seek
input of independent biologists before making listing decisions.”19 If this explanation is
true, an obvious goal behind that effort would be to increase objectivity and consistency.
In 1973 the ESA, which was made possible by the enormous political support for
environmental ideals at the time, became “the most comprehensive legislation for the
preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation.”20 Among the numerous
improvements (from the preservation perspective) it set forth were the inclusion of
species not yet on the brink of the abyss,21 protection for plant species,22 prohibitions of
private actions on private land,23 and a requirement that federal agencies must not
jeopardize the continued existence of a protected species.24 The ESA's 1982 amendments
also made a key change to the listing process, adding the word “solely” before the
existing language of listing “on the basis of the best scientific and commercial
information available,”25 thus creating the somewhat controversial “strictly science
mandate.”26 The purpose of this change was to do away with the irrelevant economic

18

H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 20 (1982).
Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn't
Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1043 (1997).
20
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 174.
21
See Pub. L. No. 93-205, §§ 3(15), 4(d). Threatened status was to be granted generously to any
species at a “measurable risk” of extinction. H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, at 11 (1973).
22
See Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 3(11).
23
See id. § 9.
24
See id. § 7.
25
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1).
26
For an in-depth discussion of this requirement, see generally Doremus, supra note 19.

19
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impact analyses being conducted by the Reagan administration and require listing
determinations to be purely about a species' biological condition.27
At several points in the evolution of the ESA, Congress has made clear that the
listing process was intended to move forward as quickly and efficiently as possible. First,
in explaining why the 1969 Act did not require the formal Administrative Procedure Act
procedures to be followed, Congress stated that “[i]f the full right of hearing and judicial
review is granted, the publication of the final list may be delayed for many months—
months which may be crucial in determining whether a given species or subspecies will
be able to survive.”28 In 1979, concerned with the slow pace of listings that had resulted
in only a tiny percentage of listings out of the thousands of candidates,29 Congress
established a priority system for considering species for listing.30 By 1988, delay had
gotten out of control, with over 3000 candidate species, including nearly 1000 already
deemed eligible but not yet listed, and only about 50 species being listed per year.31
Congress noted that this rate would result in many species becoming extinct while they
waited,32 and directed the Secretary to monitor all candidate species and “make prompt
use” of the emergency listing process to prevent such loss.33
B. The ESA Listing Process 101
The power to list endangered and threatened species belongs to the Secretary of
the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce, who have delegated that power to the Fish
27

See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-835, at 20.
S. Rep. No. 91-526 (1969).
29
H.R. Rep. No. 96-167 (1979).
30
Act of December 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 3(6), 93 Stat. 1225-26 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §
1533(h)(3) (1988)).
31
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-478, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102
Stat.) 2306.
32
Id. at 2707.
33
Act of Oct. 7, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-478, § 1002(a), 102 Stat. 2306 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §
1533(b)(3)(C)(iii) (1988)).
28
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and Wildlife Service (FWS) and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), respectively
(collectively “the Services”).34 The majority of species—terrestrial species and
freshwater fish—are the responsibility of FWS, whereas NMFS is generally charged with
the protection of marine species and anadromous fish, such as salmonids.
A species is endangered if it “is in danger of extinction throughout all or a
significant portion of its range,”35 and it is threatened if it “is likely to become an
endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of
its range.”36 In determining whether a species fits into one of these two categories, the
Services must consider five factors:
(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or
curtailment of its habitat or range;
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or
educational purposes;
(C) disease or predation;
(D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
(E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued
existence.37
While these factors do constitute “criteria” to consider in determining a species’ listing
status, these criteria are highly generalized and subjective. This Article advocates instead
for quantitative criteria, which are more objective and consistent from one species to the
next.

34
35
36
37

16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(1). 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2006).
16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
Id. § 1532(20).
Id. § 1533(a)(1).
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Citizens may petition the Secretary to list, uplist, downlist, or delist a species,38
and the Secretary must acknowledge the petition within thirty days.39 The Secretary has
ninety days to determine whether the petition “presents substantial scientific or
commercial information indicating that the petitioned action may be warranted.”40 In
order to qualify, this would be “that amount of information that would lead a reasonable
person to believe that the measure proposed in the petition may be warranted.”41 If the
petition passes this bar, the Secretary must then commence a status review of the
species,42 and is required within twelve months to determine whether the listing is
warranted, not warranted, or warranted but precluded by competing demands.43
The final category—warranted but precluded—was the brainchild of the Reagan
Administration, putatively to allow those species in greatest need to be addressed first.44
It was never intended “to allow the Secretary to delay commencing the rulemaking
process for any reason other than the existence of pending or imminent proposals to list
species subject to a greater degree of threat.”45 In reality, however, it has become a major
source of additional discretion, leading to politically-based decisions rather than
prioritization on the basis of threat. The category is an ER waiting room strewn with the
corpses of those species who were forced to wait too long.

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
50 C.F.R. § 424.14(a).
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
50 C.F.R. § 424.14(b).
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B).
H.R. Rep. No. 97-567 (1982).
Id.
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The status review is to be conducted in the same manner for citizen petitions as it
is for those initiated by the agency.46 The Services have issued policy statements
regarding the information standards for the status review process. Some of the
requirements thus created are: 1) biologists must evaluate all information used;47 2) these
biologists must prefer primary sources wherever possible;48 3) they must also seek out
and objectively evaluate data that conflicts with the agency’s position on the advisability
of the listing;49 and 4) the agency must obtain peer review by “three appropriate and
independent specialists” for all listing proposals.50 Although these procedures generally
coincide with those of the scientific method, it is worth noting that no discretion has been
relinquished here. The scientists are either agency biologists or, in the case of the three
mandatory peer reviews, specialists hand-selected by the agency. In addition to selecting
the peer reviewers, the agency is also free to choose not to follow their advice, though it
does have to include a summary of their views in the final rule.51
As noted above, the status review results in one of three possible findings. A
negative finding—either not warranted or warranted but precluded—is subject to
immediate judicial review.52 A warranted finding proceeds with the administrative
rulemaking process before listing, and is thus not final agency action subject to review.53

46

Kevin Cassidy, Endangered Species’ Slippery Slope Back to the States: Existing Regulatory
Mechanisms and Ongoing Conservation Efforts Under the Endangered Species Act, 32 ENVTL. L. 175, 188
(2002).
47
Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy on Information Standards Under the Endangered
Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34, 271 (July 1, 1994).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy for Peer Review in Endangered Species Act Activities,
59 Fed. Reg. 34, 270 (July 1, 1994).
51
Id.
52
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(ii).
53
James C. Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act Under the Microscope: A Closeup Look From a
Litigator’s Perspective, 21 ENVTL. L. 499, 513 n.55 (1991).
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Finally, if the agency does not take action within the required time limits, citizens can sue
to compel agency action.54
Once an action is deemed warranted, a final proposed listing regulation is
published,55 and citizens have forty-five days to request a hearing.56 The public has sixty
days to comment on the proposed listing,57 and the final published rule includes a review
of these comments, summaries and explanations of any data used, and “a summary of
factors affecting the species.”58 The listing is to take effect no less than thirty days after
the publication of the final rule, and no less than ninety days after it was formally
proposed.59
C. Lock, Stock, and Barrel: The Benefits of Getting Past the Velvet Rope
Although the listing process is somewhat broken, in the event that a species is
lucky enough to make it through alive, the ESA has much to offer. It is because of the
extensive protections offered these species that the ESA is so often called the “pit bull” of
environmental legislation.60 This view, of course, ignores the fact that these generous
protections are exceedingly difficult to come by, resulting in a statute with far duller
teeth. In any event, the protective portion of the ESA is quite powerful, which is why the
listing process is so incredibly important.

54

16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B).
56
Id. § 1533(b)(5)(E); 50 C.F.R. § 424.16(c)(3).
57
50 C.F.R. § 424.16(c)(2).
58
Id. § 424.18(a).
59
Id. § 424.18(b)(1)-(2).
60
See, e.g., George Cameron Coggins, An Ivory Tower Perspective on Endangered Species Law, 8
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3, 3 (1993); Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its
Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 279 (1993);
Robert D. Thornton, Searching for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation Planning Under
the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL. L. 605, 605 (1991); Steven P. Quarles, The Pit Bull Goes
to School, 15 ENVTL. F., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 55; Timothy Egan, Strongest U.S. Environment Law May
Become Endangered Species, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1992, at A11.
55
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The first thing the agency must do upon listing a species is to designate critical
habitat areas to allow that species some living space.61 The listing then “triggers the duty
to prepare a recovery plan; the duty to conserve the species; the duty to consult; the duty
to ensure that federal action is not likely to ‘jeopardize’ listed species or adversely
modify critical habitat; and a prohibition on ‘taking’ listed species.”62 The following is a
slightly more detailed description of the two most key protective sections of the ESA:
section 7 consultation requirements and section 9 take prohibition.
First, section 7 requires all federal agencies to ensure that the actions they carry
out, fund, or authorize (such as by granting permits to private individuals) are not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of any listed species or adversely modify any
designated critical habitat.63 This is accomplished by the action agency via formal
consultation with the wildlife agency responsible for the species at issue, which is any
species that may be affected by the agency action.64 The Secretary must then issue a
formal biological opinion determining whether the action is or is not likely to jeopardize
the species or adversely modify the critical habitat.65 The action agency holds the
ultimate responsibility for compliance with the section and is not bound by the biological
opinion in determining how to proceed.66
Second, section 9 prohibits any person, public or private, from “taking” a listed
species of fish or wildlife.67 “Take” is a term of art, and a relatively broad one,

61

16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i).
Laurence Michael Bogert, That’s My Story and I’m Stickin’ to It: Is the “Best Available” Science
Any Available Science Under the Endangered Species Act?, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 85, 96 (1994) (internal
citations to the statute omitted).
63
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
64
50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4).
65
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). For a more detailed description of the consultation process, see [cite].
66
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1976); 50 C.F.R. § 402.15.
67
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1).
62
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encompassing both direct harm to the animals and indirect harm through habitat
alterations that injure the animals.68 “Section 9 imposes extraordinarily broad liability,
particularly in comparison to the laws that preceded it.”69 Endangered species are
automatically entitled to this protection via the ESA, while threatened species must be
granted section 9 protection via regulations.70 All threatened species (with limited
exceptions) governed by FWS have this coverage,71 and NMFS provides it case by case
to individual species.72
III. DOOMED FROM THE START: HISTORY OF A FLAWED AND DAMAGED
LISTING SYSTEM
After several decades with an inadequate process for listing decision-making, the
ESA has developed quite a checkered history. Beginning with an unclear statutory
directive, followed by immense political pressures on administrations unwilling or unable
to come up with a well-organized listing plan, the candidate species backlog has
continually increased. This Part reviews what is wrong, finding that the listing system
was both initially flawed and then further damaged over time.
A. A Poorly Articulated Directive: Ambiguity and Excessive Discretion
The well-meaning and then-passionate goals of the ESA were ill-fated from the
start. In directing the agencies to list species, the ESA uses ambiguous language, without
strict definitions for the most key terms. The agencies are to list species as either
“threatened” or “endangered” on the basis of the “best science available,” but none of
these terms have any sort of universal meaning. Indeed, the listing requirement can
68

Id. § 1532(19).
Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act’s Best
Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 405 (2004).
70
16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
71
50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (1995).
72
50 C.F.R. § 227.11 to 227.x [need to get current end cite].

69

13

barely be deemed to have an “intelligible principle,” as required to maintain its
constitutionality.73
1. This “Best” is Better Than What, Exactly?
“Best” is a purely relative term. It connotes no actual quality of its own, but is
merely better than something else, assuming there is anything else. “’Best’ … obviously
does not mean good, reliable, conclusive, adequate or accurate. It means better than
something worse, which could be and obviously is sometimes—bad.”74 Courts have been
reticent to analyze the meaning of this “best science” requirement, resting on the
powerful combination of APA arbitrary and capricious review and Chevron deference.75
As a result, “the listing process has become tautological: the science is adequate to
support a listing decision under section 4 if the Secretary” deems it so.76
2. How Endangered is Endangered? How Threatened is Threatened?
In determining the degree of vulnerability a species faces, there is no scientifically
accepted biological definition for either “threatened” or “endangered.”77 In everyday
unscientific usage they actually have very similar meanings, which involve some kind of
exposure to danger.78 As a policy matter, these terms suggest some threshold of risk,
indeed two distinct thresholds, but the ESA is silent as to where these thresholds lie.79

73

See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (“If Congress shall lay down by
legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to
conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”).
74
Robert E. Gordon, Jr., When the Best Available Data is B.A.D., The Data Error Plague, NWI
Resource, Summer 1993, at 7 (expressing concern that species are wrongly listed due to bad data and citing
to delistings for support of this theory).
75
Bogert, supra note 62, at 140.
76
Id.
77
Kristin Carden, Bridging the Divide: The Role of Science in Species Conservation Law, 30 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 165, 200 (2006).
78
Doremus, supra note 19, at 1113.
79
Id.
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Given that every species on earth faces some risk of extinction at some point in the
future, these words are meaningless without further explanation.
Some further explanation is indeed supplied. A species is endangered if it “is in
danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range,”80 and it is
threatened if it “is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future
throughout all or a significant portion of its range.”81 Looking first at the definition of
“endangered,” one can see that it suffers from the same ambiguity as the term alone—all
species are in danger of becoming extinct at some point (indeed, all species will become
extinct at some point, as surely as death and taxes). The only clarity this definition
provides is the particular danger with which the term “endangered” is concerned:
extinction. This is better than nothing, but not much.
The definition of “threatened” doubles this ambiguity: first it uses the term
“likely” without saying how likely, a flaw identical to that of the term “danger,” then that
likelihood is concerned with becoming “endangered,” which we already know has no set
meaning. Further, the term “foreseeable” is also ambiguous. The only thing that is fairly
clear, with regard to the degree of threat needed for each category, is that listed “species
must face more than a de minimis threat,” and those listed as endangered “should face a
greater or more immediate threat than threatened ones.”82
3. That’s a Lot of Discretion
So how are the Services to determine which species to list in which category,
based on what standards, and requiring how much scientific data? These are completely
open questions left entirely to the agencies to decide. Given that the essential functioning
80
81
82

16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
Id. § 1532(20).
Doremus, supra note 19, at 1117.
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of the statute rests on these questions, this leaves the agencies with significant, arguably
legislative, power and discretion.
Agencies are far less democratically accountable than Congress, and generally to
be kept in check by the judiciary, but courts need standards against which to check the
agencies’ actions. Without clear direction from a statute as to exactly what methods an
agency is expected to implement, the only kind of error a court can look for is that of
extreme misbehavior.83
B. The Fallibilities of Science In Relation to the ESA
There are some additional flaws with the statutory text relevant to this discussion,
but not entirely appropriate for inclusion in the preceding subsection because ambiguity
is not the source of these problems. Indeed, Congress was quite clear on this point:
listing decisions are to be based solely on the best available science.84 This strictly
science mandate is problematic in at least two notable ways, both of which involve
science’s weaknesses as a policy machine. First, as many other scholars have pointed
out,85 science cannot make policy decisions, so questions which retain any elements of
policy cannot be answered solely on the basis of science. Second, science is inherently
uncertain, and certainty is often demanded in legal settings. The ESA lacks any direction
as to how the agencies and the courts are to deal with uncertainty.
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1. Science Cannot Determine Policy
Although the language of the ESA suggests that the standards for making
decisions about listing, jeopardy, etc., are to be purely scientific, analyses
of ESA implementation show clearly that tradeoffs among conflicting
objectives must be made in almost every instance.86
In light of the unambiguously strict mandate, “Congress has forced agencies into
a ‘science charade,’ in which they must pretend to make non-scientific decisions entirely
on the basis of science.”87 The task to which Congress has set the agencies is impossible
to implement, as conservation choices cannot be made by science alone without injecting
policy considerations.88 The result is that agencies are forced to do their decision-making
in private, without revealing their prohibited policy considerations, which renders their
already unchecked power even less accountable. The ambiguities in the statute leave
significant policy choices unmade: How much risk is our society willing to take that
species will be lost forever? How many sacrifices are people willing to make to prevent
this? More specifically, how endangered does a species have to be to get listed in either
category? These questions have not been generally answered anywhere. They certainly
cannot be answered scientifically.
Scientists have been trying to get this across as well, complaining:
“Conservationists have commonly confused the task of assessing extinction risk with that
of setting priorities for conservation action. Assessing the risk of extinction is a purely
biological problem,” whereas setting conservation priorities requires more subjective
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considerations.89 As one biologist astutely pointed out, the passing of the buck to
“science” has led the agencies to make these policy decisions separately for each species,
which makes for very unscientific policy:
The threshold at which a species is defined as endangered, as Mark
Shaffer (1981) has pointed out, is essentially a policy rather than a science
decision. Such policy decisions are made on a species-by-species basis,
leading to decisions of endangerment that are not equitable across species.
Courts, lacking scientific knowledge and specific biological criteria with
which to judge decisions, typically defer to the expertise of the
implementing agency.90
There is no serious question that policy decisions remain that go beyond the text
of the ESA, yet none of the branches of government have yet attempted to deal with these
choices. Absent clear criteria for determining whether a species is threatened,
endangered, or neither, the agencies will continue to reinvent the values wheel for each
and every listing decision. Even with the best of intentions, there is no way to achieve
any consistency with this system.
2. Nothing is Certain: Deal With It
I promise nothing complete; because any human thing supposed to be
complete, must for that very reason infallibly be faulty.
Herman Melville, Moby Dick
A fundamental difference between science and policy is the differing expectation
of certainty. Scientists work toward certainty, never expecting to quite reach it, but
hoping to get as close as possible to that elusive goal,91 whereas policymakers like to
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make “informed decisions” that rest on certain premises. When it comes to implementing
the ESA, there will rarely be enough data to be certain regarding a species vulnerability
status, yet we must move ahead with the process anyway.92 The agencies must decide
quickly, often before they are able to gather all relevant information on even the most
well-studied species, if there is to be any hope of saving those in need of our help.93
The courts have also recognized this situation, requiring the agencies to move
forward in spite of incomplete data, stating that they “must rely on even inconclusive or
uncertain information if that is the best available at [decision] time.”94 Indeed, simply by
invoking science at all, Congress implicitly endorsed reliance on uncertain information,
because “[i]t is inevitable, given the nature of science and the nature of species
conservation, that agencies must often act with an incomplete understanding.”95 It is
clear that the agencies must act in spite of missing or uncertain data, but they have yet to
adequately deal with the situation.
Dealing with uncertainty is no passive thing—it is not about acceptance, but
rather actions that must be taken to address it. The response to uncertainty needs to move
from avoidance to accommodation.96 In order to work toward more consistent and
objective decision-making, “lawmakers must understand and provide for the data gaps
and uncertainties that characterize science in general, and ecosystem-based science in
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particular.”97 One method of actually reducing uncertainty without additional data is to
set well-defined criteria. As one biologist has noted, “such a methodology would aid in
reducing uncertainty and allow for more equitable and objective comparison of species
by their degree of vulnerability.”98
Not only is uncertainty acceptable in science in general, but it is especially
unavoidable in environmental decision-making. Consider, for example, the fact that the
ESA listing process comes with deadlines (which is by necessity as we do not have an
indefinite time to make these decisions regardless of the legal limits) and requires no
independent agency research to add to the existing data pool.99 Given that the data has
been so expressly limited (most of all by the time constraints), it would be unreasonable
to require a certain quantity of data in order to list species, which would effectively put
the brakes on the whole process.100
But what of the 95% certainty expectation so often observed in scientific
literature? Is that scientific, and if the scientists expect it, shouldn’t the agencies apply it
in keeping with the best available science? Actually, while many peer-reviewed journals
set the bar at 95% certainty for scientific conclusions, even that is an arbitrarily
determined figure with no scientific basis.101 Moreover, the D.C. Circuit has made clear
that this certainty benchmark does not apply to the world of environmental regulation:
While awaiting [95%] certainty may constitute the typical mode of
scientific behavior, its appropriateness is questionable in environmental
medicine, where regulators seek to prevent harm that often cannot be
labeled “certain” until after it occurs. … Where a statute is precautionary
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in nature, the evidence difficult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting
because it is on the frontiers of scientific knowledge … we will not
demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect.102
In sum, the strictly science mandate requires the use of uncertain data, which in
turn requires the agencies to articulate a plan for how to work with uncertainty and gaps
in data. This unaddressed matter and the policy decisions regarding risk aversion are
both weak spots in the ESA listing scheme as it stands.
C. Turning Lemons into Lemons: The Sloppy Application of Poor Instructions
The agencies have not only failed to do anything to improve upon the mistakes of
Congress in drafting the ESA, they have actively made it worse with their haphazard
approach to implementing the statute. Instead of attempting to clarify the definitions of
“endangered” and “threatened,” the listing regulations simply repeat the very same
ambiguous language used in the statute.103 The little additional guidance FWS provides
is an apparent requirement in practice that “endangered” species be in “imminent” danger
of extinction,104 but it provides no elucidation of “imminent,” which thus becomes just
another equally ambiguous standard.
“Not only do the agencies refuse to formulate explicit listing standards, they offer
no apology for the apparent inconsistency of their decisions.”105 There is little
relationship between listing status and vulnerability: many unlisted species are in great
danger of extinction while those species that are listed are not always the most
102
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vulnerable.106 In addition, no standard exists even to distinguish threatened from
endangered,107 so the agencies are free to pick whichever they prefer, given the political
climate of the moment.108 The lack of correlation between listing status and risk of
extinction is evidence of this.
A study that reviewed the complete history of listing decisions through 1996
found there to be no evidence of consistent standards for identifying species as
endangered or threatened.109 This study found that mammals were more likely to be
listed than birds, reptiles, or fish, which was evident from the fact that mammals
consistently had higher remaining populations than did other species in the same listing
category.110 The study further revealed that the language used to justify listing decisions
had inconsistent meanings, depending upon the type of species.111 For example, the use
of the terms “rare” and “extremely rare” did not correlate with population data.112 In
addition, the study revealed that there was often available biological data regarding both
“historic and current distribution, population, habitat, reproductive potential, and forage
and/or prey information as well as information regarding past and future impact from
humans, exotics, pollution, disease, and [other] organisms,” which was not included in
the final listings.113
Not only are listing decisions inconsistent, they are also intentionally delayed,
taking advantage of the listing bottleneck created by the “warranted but precluded”
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category in order to increase agency discretion.114 The category “has become a black
hole for unlisted endangered species,” some of which spend decades there.115 Far more
species enter this waiting room for the unloved than are actually listed.116 It is a horrible
situation, but one that works quite well for the agencies, as the more species they list, the
more actively involved they must become in the conservation of these species.117 Interior
has made this very argument in objecting to increased funding for the listing process,
calling listing a “lower priority activity,” that simply leads to greater funding needs for
recovery, consultation, and the like.118
D. Plenty of Blame to Go Around: The Intense Political Pressures on the Listing Process
The significant agency discretion and complete lack of objective standards has
opened the floodgates for political lobbying from interest groups of all ideological
persuasions. Political pressure frequently inhibits the listing process.119 For the more
controversial species, “citizen petitions are required to begin that process and frequently
litigation is necessary to complete it.”120 This results in most species, out of those that
make it at all, reaching the list at an extremely late stage of their decline.121 And those
are the lucky ones. “Faced with political opposition and threats of lawsuits from property
owners and other economically interested parties, the FWS sometimes finds that the
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simplest course is to avoid making the listing decision altogether.”122 Unfortunately there
is no such thing as not making a decision, as failure to list a dying species is itself a very
meaningful decision.
Repeated investigations by the General Accounting Office have consistently
found that listing decisions are more politically driven than based on science.123
Particularly strong evidence of this comes from a study published in 1999, which found
“that public opposition and support can substantially slow and hasten, respectively, the
progress of candidate species through the parts of the listing process most directly under
the agency’s control.”124 The study found that the rate of the listing process was
positively affected (sped up) by either a supporting petition (direct public pressure) or the
presence of a pro-environment congressperson from the region in which the species lives,
while it was significantly slowed down by either direct public opposition or the presence
of a pro-development congressperson from the region in which the species lives.125 It is
too bad that animals don’t know about forum-shopping! Interestingly, the study found
that when there is pressure from both sides, while it can cause some initial delay
(especially where opposition dominates over support), it generally results in speeding up
the process, as often significant additional support jumps in once there is early
opposition.126 This may sound like a net benefit to the species; however, fair and

122

Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and Incentives,
49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 312 (1997) (noting that the FWS can easily postpone the decision indefinitely by
either a finding of inadequate information or a determination that listing is warranted but precluded).
123
See, e.g., U.S. General Accounting Office, Endangered Species: Factors Associated with Delayed
Listing Decisions (1993); U.S. General Accounting Office, Endangered Species: Spotted Owl Petition
Evaluation Beset by Problems (1989); U.S. General Accounting Office, Endangered Species: A
Controversial Issue Needing Resolution (1979).
124
Amy Whritenour Ando, Waiting to be Protected Under the Endangered Species Act: The
Political Economy of Regulatory Delay, 42 J.L. & Econ. 29, 29 (1999).
125
Id. at 47-48.
126
Id. at 50.

24

meaningful protection for endangered species can only come in the absence of such caseby-case political sway.
As one commentator has noted, “[e]ven relatively uncontroversial decisions seem
sensitive to the agencies’ perception of the direction of the political winds.”127 In an
apparent testing of the political waters, FWS has proposed species for listing as
threatened and, with no change in the data but the notable absence of opposition to the
listing, went on to list the species as endangered.128
A major problem with this politically driven system is that it heavily favors
charming species over those that may be more valuable to their ecosystems (neither of
which is a factor in the ESA, but at least the latter has some relationship to the ultimate
goal of preserving biodiversity), and abandons the ESA’s goal of protecting all species
equally on the basis of threat alone. Although they express an ethical interest in
protecting biodiversity, “most Americans remain fixed on a narrow segment of the biotic
community—largely vertebrate animals, particularly creatures of special historical,
cultural, and aesthetic significance.”129 This is truly as far as it gets from scientific
reasoning. As the GAO noted in its 1989 report on the spotted owl fiasco, citing the high
emotions and economic interests involved in listing species under the ESA, FWS “needs
to be able to demonstrate that its review process and ultimate decisions have been as
thorough, independent, and objective as possible.”130 Indeed, a clear and objective

127
128
129

Doremus, supra note 19, at 1125.
Id. at 1125-26.
Stephen R. Kellert, THE VALUE OF LIFE: BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND HUMAN SOCIETY 62

(1996).
130

U.S. General Accounting Office, Endangered Species: Spotted Owl Petition Evaluation Beset by
Problems, at p. 2 (1989).

25

process is the only way out of this political quagmire. This leads to the question: how do
we get there?
IV. THERE IS HOPE: SETTING QUANTITATIVE CRITERIA LEADS TO GOOD
POLICY, GOOD SCIENCE, AND LESS CONFUSION
There are many great reasons to set quantitative criteria for each listing category,
the most important of which are consistency, efficiency, transparency and legitimacy. It
is important to note that criteria-setting is not the same thing as requiring proof that a
species meets those criteria, for as discussed above, absolute certainty has no place in
environmental regulation. Rather, criteria are set standards for species vulnerability,
standards which can be met probabilistically on the basis of incomplete information, such
as through modeling. Not only is it advisable to set quantitative criteria, but there is a
plausible argument that this method is itself the best available science. Indeed, scientists
world-wide have come together to develop the criteria used for the IUCN Red List of
species at varying levels of vulnerability. After decades of study went into preparing
these criteria, it would be wise for us to draw from this work–at least methodologically–
in setting our own.
A. Setting Quantitative Criteria Will Improve and Legitimize the Listing Process
Proposing change in the ESA listing methodology is nothing new. That said,
most advocates for change base their suggestions on what will be most likely to result in
their desired outcome, whether that be fewer or more generous listings.131 Those with
economic interest in reducing the number of species listed generally advocate for
requiring more scientific data in order to list a species. They often rest this argument on
the combination of the strictly science mandate and the traditional scientific method,
131
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which tests a hypothesis with a strong preference for the null hypothesis (that the
hypothesis is false).132 This simply does not work in the ESA context. “To concurrently
employ both ‘purely scientific’ and ‘ESA compliant’ standards in the face of substantial
uncertainty will, at times, be impossible, because the two doctrines have been fashioned
to prevent different types of errors.”133 Specifically, the scientific method strongly favors
the null hypothesis in order to prevent false positives (called “Type I error”), while the
ESA directs the agencies to list all species that are endangered or threatened, thus
requiring avoidance of false negatives (called “Type II error”).134 Requiring this
traditional style of peer-reviewed scientific method “would render ESA decision making
more like Ph.D. dissertation defenses,”135 resulting in very poor protection for the many
vulnerable species whose cases cannot be proven.
The “precautionary principle,” advocated by some environmental groups seeking
to increase listings, can be equally unrealistic, depending upon the degree of precaution
proposed. The approach I critique here is one which would resolve all uncertainty in
favor of listing a species, even where the stronger probability suggests that the species
will be fine without being listed, at least for now.136 This involves effectively flipping
the scientific method over, such that the burden of its high demand for proof is shifted in
favor of listing, rather than against it—now the burden is on the opponents of listing to
prove the species is secure. This method “would wreak economic havoc under the ESA
132
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and … would severely reduce the statute's legitimacy from its already tenuous status.”137
This is the last thing anybody needs, especially those who support the ESA's continued
strength.
My proposal suffers from neither of these ailments. As a theoretical matter,
setting criteria is a completely separate thing from designating the degree of evidentiary
proof required to meet those criteria. As a practical matter, setting quantitative criteria
tends to render the process more objective, requiring administrators to treat like cases
alike through the use of “reasonably definite standards.”138 “Striving for consistency
from case to case is essential for equal justice.”139 Setting quantitative criteria promotes
fairness among species up for consideration, preventing the ad hoc application of the
above-described philosophies. “Any federal regulatory policy must be uniform in its
application, or it will be perceived as unfair.”140 As the ESA is currently implemented,
that is exactly how it is perceived—from both sides!
The ESA is in desperate need of increased political legitimacy, which adherence
to consistent standards would provide. In a typically unscientific move, FWS developed
a system that favored species according to life-form,141 in spite of the fact that there is no
biological justification for treating vertebrates differently from invertebrates or plants.142
Congress immediately stepped in with its 1982 amendment forbidding discrimination
according to life-form,143 yet the agencies continue to treat species differently on this
basis. For example, different methods of measurement are used for measuring
137
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reproduction in different classes of species (such as eggs per clutch, clutches per year,
young per pair, litter number, productivity), rather than a measurement that could be used
across taxonomic classes, such as realized natality.144
“If the agency were mandated to address a set of documented, objective,
biological criteria within and across classes, and if these criteria were then made available
to the scientific community, the courts, and the public, then ‘arbitrary or frivolous’ listing
actions might be effectively eliminated.”145 In addition to increasing fairness among
classes of species, consistent standards would prevent the phenomenon of “shifting
baseline syndrome,” in which species further along in their decline are met with lower
expectations for population levels, and thus increase fairness among species with
different levels of existing human interference.146
The use of clearly defined criteria is not only more consistent, it is far more
efficient than determining, for each and every species individually, what our expectations
are for viability. This long drawn-out debate over each separate listing is the cause of the
enormous backlog of candidate species. “Until the backlog in listing species is
addressed, developers will continue to be surprised by the discovery of ‘new’ species,
while environmentalists look at a mounting toll of unlisted species that have entirely
disappeared.”147 In addition, much time is wasted debating how to prioritize species for
consideration (e.g., based on degree of threat or potential for recovery)148 or on how best
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to monitor the species languishing in the waiting areas,149 time that could be invested in a
plan to get rid of the backlog altogether. We need to find a way to get this job done and
stop arguing about how to deal with the absence of this accomplishment.
Delays have not only led to this infamous backlog, but also directly affect the
outcome of individual listing decisions. In Amy Ando’s study, cited above for its
discovery that political influences affect timing for listings,150 she also found that delay
was correlated with outcome.151 Delay made it more likely for a species to be “demoted”
to a stage backward in the process,152 and less likely to be “promoted” (ever) to the next
stage in the process.153 Delay can also “enable private citizens and firms to take
preemptive irreversible actions (harvesting trees, developing land) on the land that will be
protected once the listing is made.”154 Of course, Ando also found that delay increased
the likelihood that a species would go extinct while awaiting decision.155 Moreover, even
if a species does eventually get listed, “the longer the ESA waits to protect a species, the
worse the species' chances for recovery.”156
There are two common arguments against setting standard listing criteria. First,
there is the theory that doing so is a clear articulation of policy and thus violates the
strictly science mandate. I disagree with this interpretation of the statutory text. The
ESA directs the Secretary to “make determinations required by subsection (a)(1) solely
on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available to him after conducting a
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review of the status of the species … .”157 This text refers both to the individual listing
subsection and to scientific data available in relation to the review of an individual
species, so the “determinations” it speaks of are clearly individual listing determinations.
Since this text has been included in the ESA, there have been many policies promulgated
to address general listing issues,158 none of which has been struck down on the basis of
the strictly science mandate.
Setting across-the-board criteria is not an individual listing determination subject
to this strictly science requirement, but rather a formula in which to enter that scientific
information. In fact, it is a framework that would effectively limit the individual listing
considerations to those based on science, thereby increasing compliance with the strictly
science mandate. As scientists regularly point out, once the criteria are set, analyzing
viability against those criteria “is purely a biological problem.”159 Setting quantitative
criteria takes the policymaking out of the day-to-day process.
Further, endangered and threatened are ambiguous terms, thus allowing the
agencies to interpret them in any reasonable fashion. This position gains powerful
support from Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, in which
the Ninth Circuit granted Chevron deference160 to the agencies’ joint policy setting
criteria for listing distinct population segments under the ESA, noting that “Congress
expressly delegated authority to the Services to develop criteria for evaluating petitions to
list endangered species.”161 Thus, setting quantitative criteria would not violate the
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strictly science mandate; rather, it would simply be an interpretive step necessary to
implement the statute. Once that interpretive step has been taken, it will become far
easier to abide by the strictly science mandate in individual listings.
The second argument, which has been raised by FWS among others, is that a
“one-size-fits-all” approach is incompatible with science because different species
function differently.162 As I will discuss in greater detail in the subsection on IUCN
criteria, much of this difficulty can be resolved by setting a variety of criteria that apply
according to life-cycles of species, and which encompass the varying ways species begin
to exhibit decline. Further, if there remains concern regarding this issue, even after
attempting to catch the differences when setting the criteria, there is always room for
some flexibility. For example, we could treat the criteria as guidelines that must be
followed most of the time, and require strict procedures for explaining any deviation from
them. This way, outliers could be addressed, but the haphazard approach we have now
would be strongly discouraged by the difficulty of making exceptions.
For an excellent example of how well this can work, we need look no further than
Florida, the state that has been the most willing to embrace the setting of quantitative
objectives for wildlife conservation.163 “The Florida Forever Act of 1999 explicitly
recognizes that measurable goals are central to successful conservation programs.”164
Florida used a series of population viability analyses to determine its criteria for selecting
areas of land for conservation.165 Then, when this preset criteria led to the discovery that
massive areas of land were needed to meet the objectives, the plans were able to survive
162
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against the public outcry that ensued.166 Thanks to a solid foundation, “the objectives
remained intact because of the defensibility of the process, independent of perceived
feasibility.”167
Finally, setting quantitative criteria would meet several implicit goals Congress
suggested via the ESA’s best available science mandate. Professor Holly Doremus
provides the following list of purposes most likely served by the mandate:
First, it could promote substantively more accurate decisions in a context
where the legislature could readily conclude that science dominates
decision-making needs. Second, it might increase public trust and build
political credibility by encouraging the polity to believe that decisions are
objectively determined by the evidence, rather than chosen arbitrarily or to
serve the particular values of the decision maker. … Third, it could affect
judicial review of agency decisions, either protecting those decisions from
close examination by invoking special deference to agency expertise or
inviting more stringent review by providing the courts with an additional
standard to enforce.168
Each of these potential purposes is best served by setting objective quantitative criteria.
First, it would result in listings that were more accurate across the board by eliminating
the many confounding factors discussed above. Second, it would remove the subjectivity
that eats away at public trust. Third, it would significantly strengthen judicial review by
providing clear standards for that review. The Supreme Court has held that the best
available science standard’s “obvious purpose … is to ensure that the ESA not be
implemented haphazardly, on the basis of speculation or surmise.”169
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B. Quantitative Criteria IS the Best Available Science
The classification of the constituents of chaos, nothing less is here
essayed. Listen to what the best and latest authorities have laid down.
Herman Melville, Moby Dick
Not only would setting quantitative criteria aid in attaining the goals underlying
the best available science mandate, this sort of criteria arguably is the best available
science. Indeed, while this Article is the first in the law review context to focus on the
proposal of setting quantitative criteria for ESA listing, the argument is found throughout
the scientific literature.170 It is time for the lawyers and politicians to seek a meeting of
the minds with the biologists on this incredibly important regulatory matter.
We hear a lot about the “sound science” movement, which has led to a number of
bills proposing tougher scientific-method-like requirements for the scientific data that is
needed to list a species (but, of course, not to deny listing).171 As already discussed, such
scientific methods are based upon principles inapplicable to the ESA context and require
data that rarely exists, and thus are not “sound” for use in the listing process.172 The
scientists know better—more than 300 of them, including prominent members of the
National Academy of Sciences, signed a letter to Congress opposing the “sound science”
bills, noting that they would exclude the most sound science for the ESA context:
population viability analysis and modeling.173 Discussing this letter with the press, Dr.
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David Blockstein, a leading conservation biologist, stated that the “scientific
methodologies [must be] defined and managed by scientists, [or] they have no
credibility.”174 Fortunately, scientists have collaborated on an excellent methodology for
endangered species identification, which I discuss below in the section on IUCN criteria.
“[S]cientists understand that sound science is more of a process than an end
point.”175 Science is not just a set of data, or even the interpretations of that data, but is
also procedural, in that it is itself about process.176 There is no single universal scientific
method, but rather various methodologies which apply themselves to varying contexts.
Scientists define “sound science” differently than politicians do for the ESA context:
“The documented, systematic consideration of a set of well-defined variables and
categories within them is a necessary first step in the development of a sound, scientific
methodology for making determinations of endangerment.”177
In Andrea Easter-Pilcher’s study,178 she found that existing listings reflect a
significant lack of data and instead rest primarily on general description.179 Setting
quantitative criteria would be an excellent way to work with a lack of data. As she notes,
“this lack does not preclude systematic consideration of a set of better-defined variables
and categories within them.”180 Indeed, this would be a significantly better way to deal
with otherwise insufficient data:
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The potential use of data-hungry techniques such as population viability
analysis fades in light of the high levels of missing data reported in this
study. However, it is possible that by consistently addressing definitive
biological criteria a computerized ranking algorithm such as classification
and regression trees may be developed and used to evaluate, compare, and
rank the status of different species.181
While we cannot cure the inevitable defect of information gaps, we can certainly learn to
compare the data that we do have in a consistent manner, allowing us to gain a better
understanding of how our limited data does inform us. Setting quantitative criteria is the
best way to accomplish this.
C. The Scientist-Developed IUCN Listing Criteria: America’s Next Top Model?
Now for the best news of all: much of the work required to set up this more
objective process has already been done. The International Union for the Conservation of
Nature (IUCN) is an international non-governmental organization whose mission is to
provide scientific expertise free of political influence to aid conservation programs
worldwide.182 It initially formed in 1948 and released its first Red Data Book (listing
species by degree of vulnerability) in 1960.183 The IUCN’s most current “Red List
Categories and Criteria,” which sets out clear quantitative criteria for identifying varying
threat levels, were created over the course of more than a decade of collaboration and
revision by scientists from around the world.184 I propose that we use these criteria as a
model for setting new ESA listing criteria, ideally enlisting the aid and support of
scientists from the IUCN.
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In drafting the early endangered species statutes, both houses of Congress
specifically suggested that reference to the IUCN’s Red Book “should be especially
valuable in identifying” species worthy of being listed under U.S. legislation.185 They
also recommended direct consultation with the IUCN as a step in the listing process.186
Application of the IUCN Criteria would put us in good company, as the current criteria
“have become widely recognized internationally,” and are currently applied “by
numerous governmental and non-governmental organizations.”187 Perhaps most notable
is the 1994 adoption of IUCN-devised criteria for use in the primary international treaty
to protect endangered species, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).188 The new CITES criteria have been
described as “the most objective standards in endangered species listing being used in the
world,”189 and after the adoption of these criteria for use in CITES, “the process of listing
species became clearer and firmer.”190
The IUCN articulates four goals behind its new Criteria:
•
•

•

to provide a system that can be applied consistently by different
people;
to improve objectivity by providing users with clear guidance on
how to evaluate different factors which affect the risk of
extinction;
to provide a system which will facilitate comparisons across
widely different taxa;
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•

to give people using threatened species lists a better understanding
of how individual species were classified.191

If one were to write a wish list of what is most desperately needed in order to reform the
ESA listing process, these achievements would top that list, leaving only the question as
to how well the Criteria are suited to those goals. Given the “[e]xtensive consultation and
testing” that went into developing the Criteria,192 they are at a minimum better qualified
to attain those goals than anything else we’ve got.
The IUCN Criteria set out nine categories into which all species somewhere fall:
Extinct, Extinct in the Wild, Critically Endangered, Endangered, Vulnerable, Near
Threatened, Least Concern, Data Deficient, and Not Evaluated.193 Species that fall into
the three categories from Vulnerable through Critically Endangered are generally referred
to as Threatened,194 and are the sort of species on which the ESA focuses. The five
criteria used for each of these three categories function very similarly, distinguishable
primarily by the actual numbers they set. These five criteria were designed to
collectively address the viability indicia of all taxa, so for any given species one criterion
will be more applicable than another.195 For this reason, each species is to be evaluated
against all criteria, but need meet only one criterion in order to be listed at that level.196
The first criterion is based on a reduction in population, with varying percentages
depending upon the cause and time-frame at issue, which I will lay out in more detail
than the other criteria. For a population reduction over the last ten years or three
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generations (whichever is longer), but for which the cause has been discovered and
ceased and is reversible, we look for a 90% reduction for Critically Endangered, a 70%
reduction for Endangered, and a 50% reduction for Vulnerable.197 For that same time
period, but where the cause has not ceased or may not be reversible, we look for an 80%
reduction for Critically Endangered, a 50% reduction for Endangered, and a 30%
reduction for Vulnerable.198 If we are projecting into the future for the same period of
time, we look for these same latter percentages, and likewise for a period of that length
which is presently underway (part past, part future).199
The second criterion sets quantitative figures for geographic range, dealing both
with extent of occurrence and area of occupancy.200 The third criterion considers total
population size in conjunction with decline and/or fluctuations.201 The fourth criterion
simply looks at population size, without requiring decline or fluctuation, and thus sets the
population figures for each category significantly lower than those in the third
criterion.202 The fifth and final criterion is pure population viability analysis, requiring a
probability of extinction in the wild within varying lengths of time/generations and at
varying percentages, depending upon the category.203 Although all five criteria are
divided into three categories of vulnerability, it would be possible, ideally through
consultation with the IUCN, to structure the criteria around the ESA’s threatened and
endangered categories.
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The IUCN Criteria were built on the cutting edge of developments in population
viability analysis, have stood up well for over a decade, and “represent a significant
advance over other systems.”204 If the Services refuse to consider using this type of
quantitative criteria for listing endangered and threatened species under the ESA,
Congress should direct them to do so, as the current reach of agency discretion is too
great. If neither branch makes any effort to move in this direction, the public deserves an
explanation as to why the best scientific developments are not being utilized.
V. WHICH BRANCH MIGHT HAVE THE MOST SWAY?
In light of the importance—and the future of biodiversity in the U.S. may well
depend upon it—of making a move toward the use of quantitative criteria in the ESA
listing process, it is worthwhile here to consider the various avenues for doing so.
Indeed, there is at least some potential in all three branches of government, though the
balance of pros and cons greatly varies among them and this potential is most heavily
concentrated in the legislative and executive branches. Given the difficulty in locating
individuals with the motivation to use their constitutional authority for this cause, let us
consider each avenue with an open mind, as the best or most obvious one may not be
available.
A. The Regulatory Approach
The most obvious—and likely the easiest—path to improving the listing process
would be rulemaking within the very agencies that must thereafter implement it. Given
that this is an election year, we will soon have a new administration, so anything is
possible. Indeed, the Clinton administration defended the ESA from attacks by a
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Republican Congress,205 and we might soon find ourselves with another pro-environment
administration, possibly even more so.
There are many reasons why administrative regulation is likely the best way to
design the much-needed quantitative criteria for listing endangered and threatened
species. First, the rulemaking process would allow for diverse public comment, both
with regard to the policy choices involved in setting the numerical thresholds and also as
to the scientific community’s views on the criteria design itself. Second, administrative
rules could adapt more easily than legislation could as scientific knowledge develops and
as we see how the first set of criteria work in practice. Third, setting the criteria may be
too politically difficult for a split Congress, whereas the agencies can more easily work
together on the process. Finally, taking this step could help the agencies to rehabilitate
their tainted image after decades of unscientific listing decisions, as well as allow them to
escape from under the intense political pressures weighing down the listing process.
There are also disadvantages to getting this done at the administrative level,
though they are likely outweighed by the advantages. First, the agencies lack the ability
to adjust their own funding as may be required in order to achieve more comprehensive
listing reform, which would be a desirable approach. That said, this would not affect
their ability to set quantitative criteria, which is the most valuable step in the reform.
Perhaps the stickier issues would relate to limits on agency authority. Not only do some
argue that setting listing thresholds would violate the ESA’s strictly science mandate,206
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but doing so could also raise some concerns regarding whether Congress’ leaving this
step to the agencies was an excessive delegation of legislative power.207
B. Statutory Amendment by Congress
Congressional amendment would allow for more comprehensive reform of the
listing process. In addition to addressing the need for quantitative criteria, Congress
could also require some amount of data-gathering in cases where there is insufficient data
to evaluate a species against those criteria, and could fund that mandate.208 If Congress
were to take a stab at setting the criteria, it could depart from the existing
endangered/threatened pair and split species into more categories (more akin to the IUCN
criteria), which the agencies cannot do. This would also avoid the questions of
delegation and otherwise questionable agency authority, but could raise problems with
lack of adaptability and possibly inadequate public input on the details. In light of these
problems, along with the political gridlock Congress tends to experience in dealing with
the ESA, it might be wise for Congress to merely direct the agencies to set quantitative
criteria, providing them with an intelligible principle for doing so. This would avoid the
need to make the biggest policy decision, which is where exactly to set the thresholds. It
would also resolve the questions regarding agency authority to set the criteria. Indeed, if
the agencies do not act on this need soon, Congress should take this step.
C. Pressure from the Courts
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Finally, courts may begin to push for better criteria, especially when judges are
made aware of the IUCN criteria. This is the longest-shot yet discussed here, but one
federal court has already struck down a Fish & Wildlife Service interpretation of
“foreseeable future” in the definition of “threatened” because it strayed too far from the
IUCN’s criteria without explaining that departure.209 This could certainly turn out to be
an isolated incident, but if attorneys continue to argue the point, it may well become a
wider trend.
VI. CONCLUSION
We live in a time of rapidly increasing environmental awareness. While it is no
new concept that everything is connected, such that harming one thing can harm others
whose relationship is not readily apparent, it is a concept that is spreading more than ever
in the face of global warming and extraordinary rates of extinction. These issues have led
to widespread concern, so our new administration should take heed. Not only do we need
to maintain thriving ecosystems at home, but the U.S. is a relevant player in worldwide
biodiversity, so we have a duty to implement our primary biodiversity statute effectively.
Setting appropriate quantitative criteria for listing species is perhaps the single most
important step in this direction.
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